Reference page — cumulative record through Thursday, November 19, 2026 UTC. Reference pages update as the archive grows; only dated daily editions are immutable pages of record.
CVE-2026-104795
Red Hat Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19 — Insights-runtime-extractor: insights-runtime-extractor: container escape via privileged binary execution
AV AC PR UI S C I A CVSS EPSS %ile KEV
L L L N C H H H 8.8 .0018 8.0 —
AFFECTED
Product Versions Fixed
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19 unspecified 1792771524
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.20 unspecified 1792849665
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21 unspecified 1792008935
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.22 unspecified 1792844435
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5 unspecified —
TIMELINE
Oct 2 Reserved by redhat
Oct 14 Published (CNA: redhat)
Oct 20 PATCH SHIPPED — CVE-2026-104795 (Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21). Fixed in Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21 1792008935.
Description
The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`)
that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a
container, the coordinator:
1. **fork()s** a child process
2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces
3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root
filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted)
4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving
the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted
capability set**
5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability
set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0**
6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with
`process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from
`/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload**
7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()`
— executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount
namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace**
The executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with
`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor
container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.
## Affected Code
### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)
**File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs`
```rust
// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers
join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;
change_dir(current_dir);
switch_user(*process.uid)?;
if *process.uid != 0 {
perms::check_no_privileged_perms()
.expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints");
}
fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);
```
```rust
// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0
fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {
debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}");
seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))
}
```
### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)
**File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go`
```go
// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]
func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {
out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return string(out), nil
}
```
### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)
**File:** `version_executable.rs`
```rust
// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint
return Some(vec![
fpr_kind_executable,
out_dir.to_string(),
String::from(&process.command_line[0]),
String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),
]);
```
## Attack Pattern
**Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace)
**Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet
**Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node
**Attack sequence:**
1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured
versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`,
or contains `java`)
2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious
executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root
3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the
attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0
4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user
namespace
5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise
Lifecycle
Complete event history — 3 events, chronological
| Date | Event | Detail |
| October 2, 2026 | Reserved | Reserved by redhat |
| October 14, 2026 | Published | Published (CNA: redhat) |
| October 20, 2026 | PATCH SHIPPED | PATCH SHIPPED — CVE-2026-104795 (Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21). Fixed in Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21 1792008935. |
Affected
Affected products and packages — 5 rows
| Vendor | Product / Package | Ecosystem | Version introduced | Fixed |
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19 | — | — | 1792771524 |
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.20 | — | — | 1792849665 |
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21 | — | — | 1792008935 |
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.22 | — | — | 1792844435 |
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5 | — | — | — |
About this page
This is a reference page, not a dated page of record. It assembles the complete lifecycle of CVE-2026-104795 from the CVE Program record, NVD enrichment, the CISA KEV catalog, EPSS, and OSV advisories. The box score's numbers (CVSS, EPSS, KEV status) are current as of Thursday, November 19, 2026 UTC and are re-derived as the archive grows; only dated daily editions are immutable pages of record. The authoritative source for this identifier is cve.org.