boxscore/security
CVE · referencelatest edition

Reference page — cumulative record through Thursday, November 19, 2026 UTC. Reference pages update as the archive grows; only dated daily editions are immutable pages of record.

CVE-2026-104795

Red Hat Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19 — Insights-runtime-extractor: insights-runtime-extractor: container escape via privileged binary execution
  AV  AC  PR  UI  S  C  I  A   CVSS    EPSS   %ile   KEV
   L   L   L   N  C  H  H  H    8.8   .0018    8.0     —
AFFECTED
  Product                                    Versions     Fixed
  Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19  unspecified  1792771524
  Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.20  unspecified  1792849665
  Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21  unspecified  1792008935
  Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.22  unspecified  1792844435
  Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5     unspecified  —
TIMELINE
  Oct 2   Reserved by redhat
  Oct 14  Published (CNA: redhat)
  Oct 20  PATCH SHIPPED — CVE-2026-104795 (Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21). Fixed in Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21 1792008935.
CWE-250 · CNA: redhat · CVSS v3.1 · 6 references · NVD status: Awaiting Analysis

Description

The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator: 1. **fork()s** a child process 2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces 3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted) 4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted capability set** 5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0** 6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload** 7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()` — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace** The executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket. ## Affected Code ### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator) **File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs` ```rust // Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?; change_dir(current_dir); switch_user(*process.uid)?; if *process.uid != 0 { perms::check_no_privileged_perms() .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints"); } fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process); ``` ```rust // Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0 fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> { debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}"); seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e)) } ``` ### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint) **File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go` ```go // Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0] func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) { out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output() if err != nil { return "", err } return string(out), nil } ``` ### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable) **File:** `version_executable.rs` ```rust // Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint return Some(vec![ fpr_kind_executable, out_dir.to_string(), String::from(&process.command_line[0]), String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name), ]); ``` ## Attack Pattern **Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace) **Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet **Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node **Attack sequence:** 1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`, or contains `java`) 2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root 3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0 4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user namespace 5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise

Lifecycle

Complete event history — 3 events, chronological
DateEventDetail
October 2, 2026ReservedReserved by redhat
October 14, 2026PublishedPublished (CNA: redhat)
October 20, 2026PATCH SHIPPEDPATCH SHIPPED — CVE-2026-104795 (Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21). Fixed in Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21 1792008935.

Affected

Affected products and packages — 5 rows
VendorProduct / PackageEcosystemVersion introducedFixed
Red HatRed Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19——1792771524
Red HatRed Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.20——1792849665
Red HatRed Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21——1792008935
Red HatRed Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.22——1792844435
Red HatRed Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5———

Weaknesses

CWE-250

References (6)

Related

Authoritative record: CVE-2026-104795 at cve.org

Vendors: red hat

Weaknesses: CWE-250

About this page

This is a reference page, not a dated page of record. It assembles the complete lifecycle of CVE-2026-104795 from the CVE Program record, NVD enrichment, the CISA KEV catalog, EPSS, and OSV advisories. The box score's numbers (CVSS, EPSS, KEV status) are current as of Thursday, November 19, 2026 UTC and are re-derived as the archive grows; only dated daily editions are immutable pages of record. The authoritative source for this identifier is cve.org.